سال انتشار: ۱۳۹۱

محل انتشار: نهمین کنگره بین المللی مهندسی عمران

تعداد صفحات: ۹

نویسنده(ها):

Armaghan Abed-Elmdoust – PHD Student, School of Civil Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Tehran
Reza Kerachian –

چکیده:

The final aim of river quality management is to determine and execute a set of solutions and policies for waste load decrease or allocation in order to provide a standard water quality for rivers. In river quality management problems, there are different decision makers and stakeholders with different utilities. One of important issues in river quality management is to provide strategies that all stakeholders have an agreement on them and none of them would prefer to disobey them. An available way for this purpose is to model a natural process of barraging among pollution load dischargers considering assimilative capacity of river. Signaling game can model a natural bargaining among stakeholders and give strategies which all have agreement on them. In this paper, using signaling game theory, a model is developed for river quality management. The proposed model, gives complete Bayesian equilibrium and strategies for pollution treatment of dischargers. The practical utility of the proposed methodology in decision-making was illustrated through a realistic example of the Zarjoob River in the northern part of Iran